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Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes
Nelson Tebbe*
To date, every state statute that has extended marriage equality to gay and
lesbian couples has included accommodations for actors who oppose such mar-
riages on religious grounds. Debate over those accommodations has occurred
mostly between, on the one hand, people who urge broader religion protections and,
on the other hand, those who support the types of accommodations that typically
have appeared in existing statutes. This article argues that the debate should be
widened to include arguments that the existing accommodations are normatively and
constitutionally problematic. Even states that presumptively are most friendly to
LGBT citizens, as measured by their demonstrated willingness to enact marriage
equality laws, have included provisions that may well retrench on civil rights princi-
ples in ways that are significant but underappreciated. Especially at a moment when
marriage equality is moving into jurisdictions that are even more concerned with
preserving religious freedom, arguments against existing accommodations should be
made available.
INTRODUCTION
Many Americans appreciate that today new tensions are affecting the
relationship between religious freedom and equality principles. Of course,
people understand the conflict between religion and equality in different
ways and on different levels of generality. Some think of it abstractly, as a
matter of law and moral conscience, while others imagine a more specific
contest between free exercise rights and antidiscrimination law. Some are
focused on reproductive freedom for women, while others think first of
LGBT interests. Whatever their specific conceptions, however, people un-
derstand generally that the tension between religion and equality has re-
cently intensified, or at least morphed.
This article will focus on one subtopic, namely the religion exemptions
that appear in state statutes extending marriage equality to gay and lesbian
couples.1 To date, every statute that guarantees marriage equality has in-
cluded protections for those with religious objections.2
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law
School. Thanks for valuable help on previous versions to Katherine Franke, Richard Garnett,
Cynthia Godsoe, Andrew Koppelman, Kara Loewentheil, Ira C. Lupu, James Oleske, Eduardo
Pefialver, Elizabeth Sepper, and participants in workshops at Columbia Law School, the Hemi-
spheric Institute for Performance and Politics at New York University, and Harvard Law
School. Excellent research assistance was provided by Alana Siegel. Thanks for generous sup-
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'This article will use the terms religion accommodation and religion exemption
interchangeably.
2 These statutes vary, but they include the following sorts of provisions. They clarify that
clergy are not required to solemnize marriages to which they are religiously opposed (solemni-
zation provisions). They exempt religious organizations from providing goods, services, ac-
commodations, or privileges for a wedding ceremony or reception (accommodations
provisions). They clarify that certain religiously-affiliated organizations need not involve
themselves in the "promotion of marriages" to which they have theological objections (pro-
motion of marriage provisions). They lift any requirement that fraternal benefit organizations
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Consider a simple but important example. Almost without exception,
marriage equality laws contain a provision that allows religious actors to
refuse to open their facilities for the solemnization or celebration of a mar-
riage to which the actors are opposed theologically.3 What many observers
have not noticed is that these exemptions apply not only to sanctuaries or
houses of worship themselves, which can and should be protected as private
facilities, but also to public accommodations. Even buildings that are rou-
tinely rented to a wide range of consumers can be selectively closed to gay
men and lesbians wishing to hold a wedding reception. Affected facilities
include a range of event spaces that are open to the public but owned by
religious groups and affiliated nonprofits, including schools and universities.
Moreover, many of the exemptions are phrased broadly, so that they protect
religious organizations that wish to discriminate on any ground-not only
sexual orientation or marital status, but also race, ethnicity, and even religion
itself.4 Especially in states and localities that protect gay men and lesbians
from discrimination in places of public accommodation, this is a setback.5
provide insurance coverage or other benefits in violation of their religious teachings (fraternal
benefit provisions). And they sometimes specify that adoption agencies and other child place-
ment organizations need not place children in ways that contravene their faith (adoption provi-
sions). See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-624a (2009) (fraternal benefit), § 46b-35a (2009)
(accommodations), § 46b-35b (2009) (adoption); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 106(e) (2013)
(solemnization); D.C. CODE § 46-406(e) (2001) (accommodations, promotion of marriage);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-12.1 (2013) (solemnization), § 572-12.2(a) (2013) (accommodations);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/209 (2014) (solemnization, accommodations); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-
A, § 655(3) (2012) (solemnization); 2012 Md. Laws ch. 2 (accommodations, promotion of
marriage); MINN. STAT. § 363A.26 (2013) (accommodations), § 517.09 (2013) (solemniza-
tion); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37 (2010) (solemnization, accommodations); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 10-b (McKinney 2011) (accommodations), § 1 1(1-a) (McKinney 2011) (solemni-
zation); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2010) (religious organizations and housing, admis-
sion); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-3-6.1 (1956) (accommodations, fraternal benefit); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 4502(1) (2014) (accommodations), tit. 18, § 5144(a) (solemnization); WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.04.010(5) (2012) (solemnization, accommodations), § 26.04.020(6) (2012)
(accommodations).
' These accommodations provisions vary somewhat from state to state, but they appear in
almost all such laws. For example, Hawaii's recent law provides that "a religious organization
or nonprofit organization operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious organization shall
not be required to provide goods, services, or its facilities or grounds for the solemnization or
celebration of a marriage that is in violation of its religious beliefs or faith." Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 572-12.2 (2013). For other examples and citations see infra Part II.A. An exception is Dela-
ware's marriage equality law, which contains no such exemption. H.R. 75, 147th Gen. As-
semb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013).
4 Some (failed) proposals have targeted same-sex weddings. See, e.g., S. 2566, 107th Gen.
Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012) (providing broad protections to actors who object on
religious grounds to "any civil union, domestic partnership, or marriage not recognized by this
state"); H.R. 2453, 84th Leg., 2012 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012) (providing broad protections for
actions that are related to marriage or civil unions and are "contrary to the sincerely held
religious beliefs of the individual or religious entity regarding sex or gender"); Protect Relig-
ious Freedom Initiative, OREGON FAMILY COUNCIL (Nov. 21, 2013), http://perma.cc/WWG4-
HK47 ("[A] person acting in a nongovernmental capacity may not be ... [p]enalized by the
state or a political subdivision of this state for declining to solemnize, celebrate, participate in,
facilitate, or support any same-sex marriage ceremony or its arrangements .... ").
5 See infra note 138 and accompanying text (noting that some twenty-one states prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and/or gender identity in public accommoda-
tions, among other areas of economic life). Even within states that do not protect against
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Yet this is only one example. Other provisions protect religious actors
who wish to exclude same-sex married couples from a potentially wide
range of goods and services, as this article will explain. Examination of
those protections below will also serve as a point of departure for considera-
tion of some of the larger questions raised by conflicts between religious
freedom and equality rights.
What have commentators made of this situation? So far, debate over
state marriage equality and religion has been dominated by two principal
positions. On the one hand, some academics have been co-authoring letters
to state legislatures, urging them to include broad protections for religious
individuals and entities as part of marriage equality legislation. 6 For exam-
ple, they have advocated for allowing certain commercial actors to claim
religion exemptions in the marriage setting.7 They have also urged accom-
modations for government officials who object to administering weddings to
which they are opposed on religious grounds.8 These scholars have influ-
enced the debate, even if they have seen only limited success in actual state
enactments. On the other side, scholars concerned about broad religion ac-
commodations have only recently started to write opposing letters to state
legislatures.9 And in those letters, they have stopped short of criticizing the
sorts of exemptions for religion that have typically appeared in state laws
establishing marriage equality. 10 Similarly, the wider public debate has been
dominated by these two positions, even if other perspectives have been
offered. 1
This article argues that the conversation should be expanded to include
the possibility that even existing protections for religious freedom in mar-
riage equality statutes go too far in important respects. Arguments against
existing religion exemptions have not become salient, so far. There are sev-
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, some localities do so by
municipal ordinance. Some of these state and local anti-discrimination laws contain religion
accommodations themselves, or exclude religious organizations from the definition of public
accommodations, but they do not do so in a way that greatly affects this article's analysis. For a
more detailed explanation, see infra note 101.
6 For the most recent principal letters, see Letter from Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.,
Valparaiso Univ. Sch. of Law et. al, to Sen. Rosalyn H. Baker, Haw. Leg. (Oct. 17, 2013)
[hereinafter Gaffney Hawaii Letter], available at http://perma.cc/MN53-UIN4G; Letter from
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Wash. and Lee Univ. Sch. of Law et al. to Minn. Leg. (May, 2, 2013)
[hereinafter Wilson Minnesota Letter], available at http://perma.cc/AL3K-NF9B.
7 See Gaffney Hawaii Letter, supra note 6, at 4 5 (proposing to exempt individuals, sole
proprietors, and small businesses from providing, over a religious objection, (1) goods and
services for the celebration or solemnization of a wedding, (2) employment benefits to
spouses, or (3) housing, but providing an exception where alternative goods and services are
not available without "substantial hardship").
' Some government officials would enjoy an exemption only if another official were
available to administer the union, but judges would have an absolute right to refuse. See id.
9 See Letter from Dale Carpenter, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. et al., to Ill. Leg. (Oct. 23,
2013), available at http://perma.cc/GY4V-UG48.
" See id. (noting the "careful balance" struck by the bill and remarking on its accommo-
dation for use of the property of religious organizations).
" See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious
Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1169,
1191 92 (2012) (critiquing several existing statutory exemptions).
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eral possible reasons why. First, during the years when the earliest marriage
equality statutes were being drafted, the political need for religion accommo-
dations was obvious to many. 12 And today, although the political terrain sur-
rounding civil marriage for same-sex couples is quite different, the existing
exemptions carry the weight of precedent. Another reason may be that the
states that have already passed marriage equality are precisely the ones most
protective of LGBT equality. Many observers seem to have simply assumed
that the religion provisions included by friendly states must have been
appropriate.
Whatever the reason that existing religion exemptions have gone
largely unquestioned, they should be carefully examined today, before addi-
tional laws are enacted. As marriage equality extends beyond the states that
are most sensitive to equality concerns, exemptions for religious actors may
become stronger, not weaker. For example, legislators in North Carolina re-
acted to judicial imposition of marriage equality by proposing to exempt
public officials with religious objections from processing certain mar-
riages-a proposal that goes farther than existing exemptions.13 Moreover,
as social norms and political dynamics continue to shift in favor of marriage
equality, it may be possible to revisit and even repeal some of the existing
state exemptions before they become practically entrenched. Now is the time
to carefully examine the attractiveness and constitutionality of existing
approaches.
No scholar of religious freedom has critically questioned the prevailing
exemption regime. In the literature on religious freedom, as in the public
debate generally, the options are framed by wide exemptions, on one side,
and existing state approaches, on the other. Positions outside these two poles
have largely been occluded. Leading scholars of LGBT rights have launched
powerful arguments against some of the existing exemptions in their aca-
demic writings,1 4 but those arguments have not yet been incorporated into
advocacy work in state legislatures. 5 For instance, no scholar critiqued the
religion exemptions in Illinois's marriage equality law during the run-up to
its enactment, to my knowledge. This article offers those underrepresented
arguments.
Nonprofit actors will provide the focus here. Although much scholarly
attention has been devoted to for-profit businesses and their claims for relig-
12 For more detail on this political calculus, see infra note 144 and accompanying text.
13 See Berger Calls on Courts To Correct Erroneous Memo Threatening First Amendment
Rights, Jobs of N.C. Magistrates, NCPoliticalNews.com (Oct. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Berger
Calls on Courts], http://perma.cc/J7EB-HT84. Compare with Delaware's current provision
that allows "any person" to refuse to solemnize a marriage but limits the refusal ability of
"clerk[s] of the peace," who must perform the ceremony if requested by the couple. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 106 (2013).
14 See, e.g., NeJaime, supra note 11, at 1191 92, 1236 & n.289 (suggesting disapproval of
religion exemptions from antidiscrimination laws in public accommodations).
15 One new letter opposes the North Carolina proposal, see Berger Calls on Courts, supra
note 13. See Memorandum from Public Rights/Private Conscience Project on Proposed Con-
science or Religion-Based Exemption for Public Officials Authorized to Solemnize Marriages
to Interested Parties (Nov. 5, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/U7EL-SJRH.
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ion exemptions, no state has yet accommodated them in its marriage equality
law. Religious nonprofits, by contrast, have received widespread protection
but little examination.
Methodologically, this article uses a method of reflective equilibrium or
coherentism. 16 Simply put, that approach compares new situations to familiar
scenarios about which there is a high degree of confidence, and to principles
that abstract from those familiar cases. Solutions to new problems qualify as
warranted if they cohere with existing convictions in a mutually reinforcing
way.17 Comparisons to existing paradigms can generate particularly power-
ful guidance when confronting new questions of law and morality.
Here, two sorts of comparisons are helpful. First, it can be enlightening
to ask whether similar religion exemptions would be provided in the domain
of antidiscrimination law generally, particularly law that protects against
targeting on other grounds, such as race, gender, or religion itself. A match
between religion exemptions in marriage equality laws and those in other
antidiscrimination laws could be mutually reinforcing. A second-often
countervailing-comparison is to "conscience clauses" or "refusal clauses"
that protect opponents of abortion from direct involvement in terminating a
pregnancy. 8 In that area, laws typically extend significant protection, and
they do so for objections based on conscience generally, not just religion.
This article will contend that marriage equality exemptions ought to be
viewed as more analogous to religion exemptions in other antidiscrimination
laws than to refusal clauses in the area of reproductive freedom. Therefore,
religion exemptions in marriage equality laws receive justificatory support
when they cohere with religion accommodations in antidiscrimination laws,
but they need not match conscience clauses in order to be justified.
Below, Part I provides an overview of the various types of conflicts that
can arise between religious freedom and marriage equality. It then gives two
concrete examples of disputes involving same-sex couples and it argues that
both situations were rightly handled by the governments. In Ocean Grove,
New Jersey, state officials ruled against a religious organization that refused
to allow a lesbian couple access to a boardwalk pavilion that was regularly
rented to the public. And in Boston, state authorities declined to exempt
Catholic Charities from a rule that prohibited adoption agencies from ex-
cluding gay and lesbian couples. These two disputes occurred in different
states and involved different actors-religious associations operating public
accommodations and religiously-affiliated adoption placement agencies, re-
16 The method of reflective equilibrium or coherentism was introduced by John Rawis. See
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19, 44 (1972). It closely approximates how moral actors
actually solve problems of political morality, and it provides an attractive way of determining
when their claims are warranted or justified. Of course, defending those claims is beyond the
scope of this article. For a fuller explanation, see Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherent-
ism (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
17 Each element is revisable in light of the others, so that the entire system is dynamic
rather than static. See Tebbe, supra note 16, at 4.
" See infra Part I.C.4 (citing examples).
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spectively. But officials rightly resolved both of them by enforcing antidis-
crimination laws even in the face of reasonable claims for special
accommodations by religious actors. Although neither case involved civil
marriage as such, they help illustrate why broad religion exemptions are
problematic in the marriage context as well. Part I ends by showing how
those problems follow from democratic commitments to full and equal citi-
zenship, and it explains how the governments' resolutions of these two cases
cohere with precedents concerning antidiscrimination law and conscience
clauses.
Part II then argues that both decisions would likely be reversed by ex-
isting marriage equality laws. As noted above, religion exemptions in nearly
every state would unwind public accommodations protections in these set-
tings. Although exemptions for social service providers like child placement
agencies are neither uniform nor unambiguous, they nevertheless exist in
several states. And in those jurisdictions, they could well be interpreted to
license discrimination by a range of religiously-affiliated social service orga-
nizations. Part II then contends that the potential applications are wide-
spread. This will surprise people who assume that the existing exemptions
are unproblematic, perhaps because they are focused instead on proposed
provisions affecting for-profit corporations. Part II also raises constitutional
problems with the exemptions-particularly Establishment Clause difficul-
ties that arise when religion accommodations shift costs from religious ac-
tors onto third parties, namely same-sex couples.
The Conclusion considers the politics surrounding these debates, and it
speculates about how those dynamics are likely to evolve in the future. The
answers will determine whether the article's arguments are likely to remain
highly relevant. In particular, the Conclusion asks how the debate might be
influenced by judicial decisions establishing marriage equality as a constitu-
tional right in localities that are likely to be politically sympathetic to relig-
ious objections to same-sex marriage. If marriage equality continues to
spread rapidly as a result of judicial decisions, as many believe that it will,
what will the effect be on state legislation? The possibility of increased law-
making heightens the stakes of this article. If arguments against existing ex-
emptions are being neglected currently, that problem is likely to grow more
consequential as marriage equality moves into political terrain that is less
sympathetic to LGBT concerns and more inclined toward religious claims
for relief in the context of LGBT rights.
I. THE NORMATIVE CASE
To demonstrate that the existing exemptions overreach, it helps to first
establish how conflicts at the intersection of marriage equality and religious
freedom should be resolved. This Part introduces the range of laws and ac-
tors that are implicated by religion provisions in marriage equality statutes.
It then focuses in on two of those areas-namely, public accommodations
and government licensing. Despite their importance, these two areas have
[Vol. 9
Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes
been sidelined, at least insofar as they affect religious nonprofits. This Part
gives detailed examples of actual disputes in each area. Throughout, it looks
not only to courts, but to conflicts outside them as well. Finally, it argues,
using the coherentism approach, that both controversies were properly re-
solved against the religious actors. That sets up an argument in Part II that
existing religion exemptions would improperly overturn both resolutions.
A. Proposed and Actual Exemptions
A range of complex laws are affected by proposed and actual exemp-
tions for religion in marriage equality statutes. To appreciate that complex-
ity, consider first the areas of law that are affected and then the actors that
might claim exemptions in each of them.
Areas of law implicated by the exemptions are many.19 Public accom-
modations law is one potentially significant legal domain, as noted above.
Government licensing is another. Individuals and organizations of various
types must obtain licenses in order to offer their services to the public: doc-
tors, lawyers, therapists, bankers, child placement agencies, hospitals, etc.
States sometimes require various forms of nondiscrimination as a condition
of licensing, including equal treatment on the basis of sexual orientation and
marital status. Religious actors may seek special relief from those require-
ments when it comes to same-sex marriage. Could a social service agency be
allowed to refuse service to members of a couple not merely because they
identified as gay, but more specifically because they were married to some-
one of the same sex? Of late, religious actors often claim to object not to
LGBT people, or even to same-sex couples who merely cohabitate or even
raise families, but to the misuse of marriage, which they consider to be a
religious sacrament.20
Think too of employment. Religious employers might wish to refuse to
hire someone married to a person of the same sex under civil law, if not gay
and lesbian people generally.21 Probably more realistically, a religious em-
ployer might seek relief from laws that require evenhanded provision of
health insurance and other benefits to all spouses of employees, regardless of
sexual orientation. 22 Many states do require equal provision of such employ-
19 Alternatively, these could be conceptualized as subsets within anti-discrimination law.
21 Opposition to same-sex relationships other than marriage could have a religious ground-
ing as well, but for the sake of simplicity this discussion focuses on marriage.
21 See, e.g., Michelle Boorstein, Same-Sex Marriage Is New Test for Catholic Institutions
Used to 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell', WASH. PosT (Apr. 7, 2014), http://perma.cc/787T-GCRU
("[M]ore and more Catholic institutions [are] firing gay and lesbian staff members not be-
cause they are gay but because they marry.").
22 See, e.g., Lornet Turnbull, Benefits for Same-Sex Spouses an Open Question Legally,
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014), http://perma.cc/Q92Q-7ETX ("Can companies that fund their
own health-insurance plans refuse to extend benefits to their employees' same-sex spouses? ...
The question already has come up in Washington state, where O'Reilly Auto Parts last week
reached an agreement with the state attorney general to extend such benefits to same-sex
spouses after initially declining to do so.").
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ment benefits to domestic partners. Should exemptions be granted when
those employees are legally married?
Other implicated areas include fair housing laws, many of which like-
wise prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and marital
status. A landlord might refuse to rent to a married couple not simply be-
cause they are lesbian or gay, but specifically because they are married to
someone of the same sex.
Government funding and taxation is a final area. 23 A religious actor
might seek equal access to government subsidies or tax exemptions despite
discrimination against same-sex couples who are legally married. Several
statutes explicitly protect religious actors not only against, say, public ac-
commodations laws that might otherwise require them to open their facilities
to the celebration of gay or lesbian weddings, but also against defunding
because of that exclusion. 24
In addition to implicating various areas of law, religion exemptions in
marriage equality laws can involve a wide variety of actors. These include
not just houses of worship and clergy members-probably the paradigmatic
examples in the minds of most lawmakers-but also religiously-affiliated
nonprofits like hospitals, social service organizations, and universities; fra-
ternal organizations with religious ties; individual government officials such
as justices of the peace and marriage license clerks; private individuals run-
ning businesses; and, of course, for-profit corporations. All of these actors
could invoke religious convictions and seek relief from laws that would oth-
erwise require them to serve all married couples regardless of LGBT status.
Imagining a large matrix, with areas of law arrayed along one axis and
types of actors along the other, can convey some sense of the complexity of
the debate over these statutory accommodations. Although some cells in the
matrix are empty-government officials do not seek licenses, for example-
many of them do present difficult questions.
Again, this article will focus on just two areas of law, namely public
accommodations and government licensing. These two are centrally impli-
cated by existing statutes, as shown below in Part 11.25 Regarding actors, the
23 Surely there are still other areas of law affected by claims for religion accommodations,
but they will be bracketed here. Consider for instance a law requiring judicial officers to apply
the law in a uniform way, despite any religious scruples to the contrary. See Memorandum
from Public Rights/Private Conscience Project, supra note 15. See also Letter from John W.
Smith, Dir., N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, to Magistrates and Chief Dist. Court Judges and
Elected Clerks (Oct. 13, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/YUT6-GB88.
24 See, e.g., 2012 Md. Laws 2 (providing that a decision by a religious organization to
close its facilities to a wedding for theological reasons "may not ... result in any State action
to penalize, withhold benefits from, or discriminate against the entity or individual"); MINN.
STAT. § 517.201 (2013) (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 457:37 (2010) (same); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 10-b (McKinney 2011) (same).
25 Some statutes contain other troubling accommodations, though far less uniformly. For
example, the Delaware statute exempts certain public officials from administering weddings to
which they are opposed for any reason. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 106 (2013) ("[N]othing
in this section shall be construed to require any person (including any clergyperson or minister
of any religion) authorized to solemnize a marriage to solemnize any marriage, and no such
authorized person who fails or refuses for any reason to solemnize a marriage shall be subject
[Vol. 9
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article will focus on houses of worship and religiously-affiliated nonprofits,
though fraternal organizations are also relevant in some states.
Not only are these particular subjects the ones most centrally in play
under existing laws, but they have also been somewhat deemphasized by the
literature on religion exemptions and same-sex marriage. Most of the con-
versation so far has focused on for-profit companies, such as the wedding
photographer with Christian objections to working for same-sex couples. 26
Yet exclusions by nonprofits will likely also have a significant impact. Rela-
tive inattention to these important areas is a consequence of the debate's
skew toward even stronger religion protections. To get a sense of claims by
nonprofits for accommodations from public accommodations and govern-
ment licensing laws, it is helpful to consider examples.
B. Two Examples
Two illustrations not only present the issues implicated by existing stat-
utes, but they have also served as reference points in the national debate.
They therefore have importance both because of their substance and because
of their impact on the thinking of lawmakers and legal experts. The first
takes place in New Jersey and concerns public accommodations law, while
the second is from Massachusetts and involves government licensing
regulations.
Ocean Grove is a beachfront community located on the New Jersey
shoreline.2 7 Founded by Methodists, it was originally intended to allow
church members to spend their summer vacations in a Christian setting. Its
governing association owns not just a large meeting house in the middle of
the town, but also a stretch of boardwalk that includes a pavilion capacious
enough to accommodate groups. For years, the town's boardwalk pavilion
was held open to members of the public, who used it for a wide variety of
religious and secular events. Local authorities granted the association
favorable tax treatment for the pavilion, partly because it was open to the
public.
to any fine or other penalty for such failure or refusal."). On its face, this provision would even
protect officials who object to interracial marriages, and even if their objection is not stated in
religious terms. Unfortunately, refusals like that still occur, if rarely. See, e.g., Shawn Notting-
ham, Louisiana Justice Who Refused Interracial Marriage Resigns, CNN (Nov. 3, 2009), http:/
/perma.cc/WX9H-N53Y. Even though accommodations for objecting government officials
have been urged by scholars, see Gaffney Hawaii Letter, supra note 6, at 4-5, they neverthe-
less rarely appear in actual statutes. Therefore, they will not provide a focus of this article.
26 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Pur-
poses of Antidiscrimination Law, S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1) (on
file with author) (leading with the wedding photographer case); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W.
Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 Nw. J. L. & SOCIAL POL'Y 274,
275 (2010) (also discussing the wedding photographer case).
27 See Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J. Dep't of
Law and Pub. Safety Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://perma.cc/CS2W-Y2VV; NeJaime,
supra note 11, at 1202 ("[S]cholars and advocates consistently point to this case in calling for
religious accommodations in marriage equality legislation.").
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In 2007, however, the association excluded from the pavilion a lesbian
couple who wished to use the space to celebrate their civil union. After the
couple brought a complaint, a state agency found that the town had violated
New Jersey's civil rights law, which prohibited discrimination in public ac-
commodations on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status. 28 Subse-
quently, the state also withdrew tax benefits for the pavilion.29 In response to
those decisions, Ocean Grove closed the pavilion to the public.30
The second example also involves a religiously-affiliated nonprofit or-
ganization that serves the public. Catholic Charities is a nationwide network
of social service organizations affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. A
local affiliate, Catholic Charities of Boston, was one such organization help-
ing children to find foster care homes and adoptive parents. Before 2006, the
organization had routinely been placing children with same-sex couples, ap-
parently simply to help address unmet need.31 Although it had been doing so
for years, using substantial government support, the affiliate was forced to
stop the practice after church authorities became aware of it.32 Massachusetts
authorities determined that Catholic Charities' exclusion violated the state's
licensing requirements, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation and marital status in foster care and adoption placement.33
After state officials refused to grant an exemption, Catholic Charities surren-
dered its license and shut down all its placement services for children in
Massachusetts.3 4 Something similar happened afterward in San Francisco
28 Ocean Grove, No. PN34XB-03008.
29 Jill P. Capuzzo, Group Loses Tax Break over Gay Union Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18,
2007), http://perma.cc/6K2K-QMNP.
3 See Ocean Grove, No. PN34XB-03008 at 5 6.
31 See generally Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 26, at 296; Daniel Avila, Same-Sex Adoption in
Massachusetts, the Catholic Church, and the Good of the Children: The Story Behind the
Controversy and the Case for Conscientious Refusals, 27 CHILD. LEGAL RTs. J. 1, 3 (2007);
Father Robert J. Carr, Boston's Catholic Charities to Stop Adoption Service Over Same-Sex
Law, CATH. ONLINE (Mar. 10, 2006), http://perma.cc/QT4J-P4JA.
32 Reportedly, church officials became aware of the practice by Catholic Charities after
The Boston Globe published a story about it. See Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State,
Ends Adoptions, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2006, at Al.
" See 110 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.09(3) (2014) (general nondiscrimination policy); 102
MASS. CODE REGS. 1.03(2) (2014) (license requirement), 1.03(1) (nondiscrimination require-
ment); Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 n.30 (Mass. 2003) (noting
Massachusetts's laws against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in adoption).
Some have argued that the Massachusetts nondiscrimination policy was a funding condition
only. See Laura Kritsky, Reality Check: The Big Lie About Catholic Charities, Adoption and
Marriage Equality, GLAD (Mar. 10, 2011), http://perma.cc/NSG8-9ZG7. In light of the regu-
lations above, however, that perception appears to be erroneous. Massachusetts requires all
adoption agencies to be licensed and imposes nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion of all licenses. See 102 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.03(2) (2014). See also Avila, supra note 31,
at 9, 12 (describing the nondiscrimination requirement as a condition for an adoption license).
" See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 26, at 302; see also Martha Minow, Should Religious
Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 831 43 (2007).
[Vol. 9
Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes
and the District of Columbia, and also in Illinois (although there the question
was state funding rather than licensing).3 5
Not all religious social service agencies have shut down operations in
the face of antidiscrimination regulations, however. Some have decided to
comply with equality laws despite their theological objections.3 6 Reportedly,
a few Catholic Charities branches have even disaffiliated with the church in
order to continue serving needy children.3 7 And observers report that the
need for foster care and adoption placement services in Boston itself has
been met by other agencies.38
These two examples both involve nonprofit organizations that are affili-
ated with churches. Although the examples intersect with two distinct areas
of law-public accommodations law and government licensing (with gov-
ernment funding affecting both)-comparable questions of law and policy
are involved.39
C. Evaluating the Claims
This Part starts by recalling and applying some familiar principles of
law and political morality, and it then proceeds to compare these conflicts
with other claims for religion accommodations from civil rights laws about
which there is a high degree of confidence. It asks which solution coheres
best with basic principles and paradigmatic cases, keeping in mind that any
element might have to be revised in light of future lessons. It concludes that
the governments correctly handled the religious objections of Ocean Grove
and Catholic Charities of Boston.
1. Principles of Citizenship
A first principle is full citizenship-the idea that every member of the
political community should be able to exercise basic liberties consistent with
the freedom and equality of others. As Justice Jackson articulated it, "My
own view may be shortly put: I think the limits [on religious freedom] begin
15 See Laurie Goodstein, Bishops Say Rules on Gay Parents Limit Freedom of Religion,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2011), http://perma.cc/ZT4H-QGLS; Cheryl Corley, Illinois, Catholic
Charities At Odds Over Gay Adoptions, NPR (July 5, 2011), http://perma.cc/88Q8-899F.
36 See Goodstein, supra note 35 (noting that Lutheran Child and Family Services, which is
affiliated with the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod in Ill., decided to comply with the antidis-
crimination provision and continue serving children despite theological opposition).
" See id. ("The Dioceses of Peoria and Belleville are spinning off their state-financed
social services .... The work will be carried on, but the Catholic Church's seminal, historic
connection with it has been severed .... ").
38 See Gingrich Denies Facts About Same-Sex Adoption in Massachusetts, D.C., EQUALI
TYMATTERS (Jan. 10, 2012), http://perma.cc/NTD8-WR8C.
" It is quite possible that a child placement agency that is open to the public could be
treated as a public accommodation in some jurisdictions. Therefore, both government licensing
and public accommodations law could be involved in Catholic Charities cases. These areas of
law are thus interrelated again, they could both be understood as species of anti-discrimina-
tion law and they may overlap in these examples.
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to operate whenever activities begin to affect or collide with liberties of
others or of the public. '40 Madison said that religious freedom should be
immune "from civil jurisdiction, in every case where it does not trespass on
private rights or the public peace." 41 And Jefferson famously championed
religious freedom that "does me no injury" for it "neither picks my pocket
nor breaks my leg. ' 42 Full exercise of citizenship, in other words, should be
enjoyed by every member of the political community, consistent with the
exercise of basic freedoms by others.43
Today, religious freedom is generally conceptualized by federal consti-
tutional law as freedom under law, or freedom from discrimination. 44 Even
where it means freedom from general laws-as in the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), certain state laws, and federal constitutional law as
it is sometimes applied 45-the government's interest in protecting the liberty
and equality of other protected classes can override religious interests. 46
On the other side, the fundamental liberty rights of LGBT people, al-
though increasingly protected as a matter of constitutional doctrine, are vir-
tually universally understood to be freedom under law rather than freedom
from general regulations. The underlying principle seems to be full citizen-
ship for all.
A second principle is equal citizenship. Under this commitment, all
members of the political community enjoy equal standing before the govern-
ment. This principle is independent of the first. Even a person able to exer-
cise all the basic freedoms that belong to citizens is also protected from
being constituted as an essentially different sort of American. To take a re-
ligion example, the government could not declare, "America is a Christian
Nation," regardless of whether it otherwise impeded the exercise of basic
" Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson
continues, "Religious activities which concern only members of the faith are and ought to be
free as nearly absolutely free as anything can be." Id. But nonreligious activities, such as
when religious organizations engage in secular businesses to raise money from nonbelievers,
are "Caesar's affairs, and may be regulated by the state so long as it does not discriminate
against one because he is doing them for a religious purpose and the regulation is not arbitrary
and capricious, in violation of other provisions of the Constitution." Id.
41 JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 787 88 (1999).
42 THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 285 (1984). Jefferson was arguing against coercion of
belief in this passage, but it has been taken to also refer to the limits of religious freedom. See
Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, HARV. J.L. & GENDER
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 32), available at http://perma.cc/EB29-RDG4.
4' Antidiscrimination laws can be justified as liberty-based protections where markets can-
not give full effect to economic liberty because of pervasive bias. See Andrew Koppelman, You
Can't Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People Should Have Religion
Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125, 133 (2006).
' See generally Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
45 See generally Nelson Tebbe, Smith in Theory and Practice, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2055
(2011).
46 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that the IRS
may deny tax exempt status, under a general policy opposing discrimination on the basis of
race, to a university that prohibited interracial dating, even if the university was acting for
religious reasons, and even though free exercise law at the time did nominally allow for ex-
emptions from general laws).
[Vol. 9
Religion and Marriage Equality Statutes
freedoms. Justice Kagan recently explained that the Constitution guarantees
that however people worship, they "count as full and equal American citi-
zens .... [They] stand[ ] in the same relationship with [their] country ....
[W]hen each person performs the duties or seeks the benefits of citizenship,
she does so not as an adherent to one or another religion, but simply as an
American." 47
2. Applying the Principles
How do religion accommodations in marriage equality laws fare under
these principles? And how do they cohere with paradigm cases in antidis-
crimination and conscience law? Begin with a simple, paradigmatic situa-
tion: private individuals may decide whether to solemnize a particular
marriage on theological grounds, even if that decision involves discrimina-
tion on a prohibited basis in violation of public accommodations law.48 That
is true even though clergy are empowered to preside over weddings that
result in civil marriages as well as religious marriages.
So statutory accommodations of these decisions are defensible. They
are also unnecessary, because they duplicate basic constitutional law under
free exercise and the freedom of expressive association. 4 Clergy and con-
gregations have a constitutional right to shape private marriage according to
their beliefs. For example, they may refuse to perform interfaith weddings.
And they have been able to perform same-sex weddings even in states that
excluded same-sex couples from civil marriage and therefore refused to give
such unions legal effect. 50 Conversely, no state could constitutionally require
7 Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1841 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissent-
ing). Justice O'Connor articulated a similar principle in the endorsement test, which prohibited
government actions that render people "outsiders, not full members of the political commu-
nity," on account of their religious identity or beliefs. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
687 88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see Koppelman, supra note 43, at 145 (ques-
tioning the equal citizenship rationale with respect to gay men and lesbians).
48 For a full discussion of this principle, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 26, at 284 (setting
out the rule that "neither clergy nor faith communities can be directly coerced into celebrating
weddings for anyone, same-sex couples included" and citing cases). More than likely, officiat-
ing at weddings would not be held to be a public accommodation in the first place, of course.
41 See id.; Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and Relig-
ious Liberty Protections, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REv. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 6 n.24),
http://perma.cc/MWL7-8QBH ("No serious [scholar] argues that the government should force
religions to perform gay weddings (or ordinations or baptisms or other religious functions)
against their will."); Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MAR
RIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) (same).
5' A North Carolina statute seemed to prohibit even private solemnization of a marriage
without a license. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-7 (2001). Where a license was not available, because
for instance same-sex marriages were prohibited in the state, the law appeared to bar even
private ceremonies, though the statute was not entirely clear. It was challenged by the United
Church of Christ on constitutional grounds. See P1's Mem. of Law in Supp. of Their Mot. for
Prelim. Inj., General Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Cooper, 2014 WL 2451299
(W.D.N.C. 2014). Before the court could rule, the Fourth Circuit mooted the issue by invali-
dating the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage. General Synod of the United
Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790, 791 (W.D.N.C. 2014) (citing Bostic v.
Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014)).
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religious groups to perform such weddings once they became eligible for
civil recognition in a state with marriage equality. Similar reasoning allows
those congregations to decide who may use their sanctuaries for weddings,
so long as the buildings are not held open to the public.
While it is possible to imagine a law that deputizes clergy to perform
civil weddings only on the condition that they not discriminate on protected
grounds,51 the practice of allowing clergy to perform civil marriages is so
widespread and longstanding in the United States that conditioning it on
nondiscrimination would be an affront to religious freedom under under-
standings that are virtually universal today.5 2
Beyond those constitutional basics, religion accommodations quickly
become contested. Take first the exemption that allows religiously-affiliated
nonprofit organizations to close their facilities to any and all weddings and
receptions that offend their religious beliefs, even if those facilities are pub-
lic accommodations under general anti-discrimination law. Applying the
principle of full citizenship highlights an immediate problem, which is that
the accommodation appears to impinge on the liberties of others-namely
the ability of LGBT people to access facilities for the celebration of their
union in a particular community. The couple that lived in Ocean Grove, for
instance, was burdened to some degree by the religious organization's deci-
sion to close the boardwalk pavilion to them. Systematic exclusion of that
sort could significantly impact the basic economic wherewithal of same-sex
couples.
Even if the exclusion is not widespread and alternative facilities exist,
however, the principle of equal citizenship weighs against allowing public
accommodations to exclude people on the basis of sexual orientation or mar-
ital status. One of the basic purposes of antidiscrimination law, after all, is to
preserve the equal standing of members of minority groups in the economy
and in society, as in politics.53 A person's relationship with the community
can be altered with respect to equal citizenship even if adequate alternative
venues exist. Again, the two women who lived in Ocean Grove and were
excluded from its primary wedding venue subsequently had an altered rela-
tionship with the community run by the Camp Meeting Association: they
stood now not simply as residents of the town, but as committed-lesbian
51 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 26, at 282.
52 Id. at 284-85. Whether government funds could be withheld from religious entities that
refuse to perform same-sex marriages is a more complicated question. See generally Nelson
Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2008).
5' Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) ("[I]n upholding Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which forbids race discrimination in public accommodations, we empha-
sized that its fundamental object was to vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that
surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments. That stigmatizing injury,
and the denial of equal opportunities that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons
suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their
race.") (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Koppelman, supra note 26, at
7 8 ("Antidiscrimination law has multiple purposes. Canonically, they are the amelioration of
economic inequality, the prevention of dignitary harm, and the stigmatization of
discrimination.").
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residents of the town. Importantly, nothing about that altered relationship
depended on their subjective feelings of insult or isolation-it was a conse-
quence of exclusion (or it would have been, had that exclusion been legally
sanctioned). 54 A fundamental insight of antidiscrimination law is that equal
citizenship in a community can be infringed not just by government discrim-
ination, but also by exclusion from nongovernmental public accommoda-
tions that is tolerated by a legal regime. 55
A similar argument runs against the second exemption claim, concern-
ing the state's licensing provision that required child placement services like
Catholic Charities to refrain from refusing to serve same-sex couples. Not
only does exclusion restrict the access of gay and lesbian couples to foster
care and adoption placement services, but it also affects their citizenship
standing when state law explicitly protects such exclusion. According to
Massachusetts law, child placement is a public function that cannot be lim-
ited on the basis of sexual orientation but must be held open to all families
capable of protecting the best interests of the child.56
Some might argue against this application of principles of full and
equal citizenship by distinguishing between status and conduct. Discrimina-
tion against LGBT people as such is morally reprehensible and legally pun-
ishable, the argument might run, but objection to the act of marriage is
understandable and should be accommodated.5 7 Yet this distinction does not
perfectly track social meanings or practices. Marriage, like intimate sexual
conduct, may well be too closely associated with LGBT identity to be sepa-
rately proscribed without damaging citizenship interests. Justice O'Connor
rejected the act/identity distinction in the context of intimate sexual rela-
tions,58 and more recently the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected it in the
54 Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1524 (2000) (arguing official expression can work
constitutional harm not because of its effect on subjective feelings but because it alters the
legal relationship with government).
55 Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 625 26 (noting that the state's public accommodation law applied
to a range of nongovernmental actors engaged in "various forms of public, quasi-commercial
conduct" and noting that this broad definition of public accommodations "reflects a recogni-
tion of the changing nature of the American economy and of the importance, both to the
individual and to society, of removing the barriers to economic advancement and political and
social integration that have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups").
56 See sources cited supra note 33.
51 See, e.g., David Bernstein, Guest Post from Prof Doug Laycock: What Arizona SB1062
Actually Said, Volokh Conspiracy, WASH. PosT (Feb. 27, 2014), http://perma.cc/GR5W-ZYAX
("I know of no American religious group that teaches discrimination against gays as such ....
The religious liberty issue with respect to gays and lesbians is about directly facilitating the
marriage, as with wedding services and marital counseling."); Gaffney Hawaii Letter, supra
note 6, at 17 18 ("Some assume that any religious objection to same-sex marriage must be an
objection to providing goods or services to gays as such: in other words, that a refusal repre-
sents animus towards gay couples. Yet many people of good will view marriage as a religious
institution and the wedding ceremony as a religious sacrament.").
58 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he con-
duct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual. Under
such circumstances, [the] law is targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward
gay persons as a class.").
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context of unions between people of the same sex.5 9 Scholars have ques-
tioned the distinction for similar reasons. 60 Citizenship concerns are difficult
to avoid in the context of marriage, once they are recognized as relating to
sexual orientation itself.
3. Comparison to Other Antidiscrimination Protections
A method of reflective equilibrium tests these applications of familiar
principles by comparing the outcomes they suggest-the denial of religion
exemptions from prohibitions on discrimination in public accommoda-
tions-with the outcomes in familiar cases. Race discrimination is the para-
digmatic civil rights violation in America, of course, and religious objections
have arisen to marriage between people of different races as they have to
marriage between people of the same sex or gender.61 Would a religious
organization receive an exemption from public accommodations laws so it
could exclude access to a couple because of its sincere theological opposi-
tion to interracial marriage? Almost certainly not.62 Neither would it win an
exemption from a licensing regime like the one in Massachusetts. 63 Although
a few commentators have argued for a change,64 civil rights laws in the
" Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 61 (N.M. 2013). ("To allow discrimination
based on conduct so closely correlated with sexual orientation would severely undermine the
purpose of [New Mexico's antidiscrimination law].").
61 See NeJaime, supra note 11, at 1169 ("Marriage is merely one form of sexual orienta-
tion identity enactment, and religious objections to same-sex marriage are merely a subset of
objections to sexual orientation equality."); Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the
Same-Sex Marriage Debates, 89 IND. L.J. 703, 714 (2014) ("Despite attempts to resurrect a
distinction between sexual conduct and sexual orientation status, religious resistance to same-
sex marriage threatens the same antidiscrimination norms that religious objections to ... sex-
ual orientation discrimination laws did."); cf Michael C. Doff, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-
Class Citizenship, and Law's Social Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1311 14 (2011) (explor-
ing whether discrimination against same-sex conduct, such as sexual activity and relationships,
is tantamount to discrimination on the basis of status as a matter of social meaning).
61 See Sepper, supra note 60, at 714 ("Historically, as now, religious opposition emerged
in response to race, religion, or gender nondiscrimination requirements. In particular, outcry
around interracial marriage followed a pattern much like that of objections to same-sex mar-
riage."); James Oleske, The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the Unequal Treatment
of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriage, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 3-4), http://perma.cc/B7EV-BABK (noting that "religious
objections to interracial marriage were pervasive" from the 1940s through the 1960s and
drawing a parallel to current religious objections to same-sex marriage).
62 See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (calling
"patently frivolous" the claim by a restaurant owner that an anti-discrimination law "was
invalid because it 'contravenes the will of God' and constitutes an interference with the 'free
exercise of the [owner's] religion'"); cf Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983) (denying a free exercise exemption from denial of tax exempt status to a school that
prohibited interracial dating among students on religious grounds).
63 But cf. Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (turning away a Title VII
race discrimination claim under the ministerial exception).
64 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Forgotten No More, 13 ENGAGE 138, 140 (2012) (review-
ing JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY'S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012)) (ar-
guing that all groups, including commercial actors, ought to enjoy constitutional protection
when they make associational decisions, including on grounds of race).
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United States virtually never permit that sort of exemption. 65 That is true
even though religious objections to interracial marriage have long been
heard.
Is religious objection to interracial marriage different from religious ob-
jection to same-sex marriage, so that the two cannot meaningfully be com-
pared? Kent Greenawalt has offered the most thoughtful defense of that
distinction, based on two arguments. First, he maintains that the practice of
limiting civil marriage to one man and one woman has been virtually univer-
sal among cultures and religions, historically. 66 Second, he observes that
"without modern technology, it takes a union of a male and a female to
produce children." 67 Greenawalt concludes that while neither of these points
is sufficient to defend exclusions from civil marriage, they do make "com-
prehensible" a sense that "such unions are 'unnatural' or 'less natural.' 68
Whether prohibitions on interracial and same-sex marriage have been
comparably widespread over time is a matter for professional historians. It
seems at least debatable. Certainly, interracial marriages have also been con-
sidered unnatural-that was noted in the Loving opinions, among other
places. 69 And, the prohibition had been longstanding. Greenawalt might well
answer that the opposition to interracial marriage is not comprehensible, de-
spite its avowed grounding in history and biology, and therefore that it is
less worthy of accommodation, even though that opposition has been rooted
in religion. Yet if that is so, then some reason other than history and biology
must be found for saying that opposition to racial intermarriage is incompre-
hensible but opposition to LGBT marriage is not. Perhaps a reason can be
found, although it does not leap to mind. Reasonable people surely do today
disagree on whether the race analogy works.7 0
Even if it does not, however, other analogies are readily available.
Laws in both New Jersey and Massachusetts also prohibit discrimination on
the bases of religion and marital status.7 1 Ocean Grove could no less exclude
a Muslim wedding or a wedding for a divorcee, even if it had religious
65 See, e.g., Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. at 402 n.5 (denying a claim for a free
exercise exemption from an antidiscrimination law for public accommodations).
66 Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, 28 J.L. & POL. 91,
113 (2013).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (noting Virginia's rationales for prohibiting
interracial marriage, including to prevent "corruption of blood" and creation of a "mongrel
breed of citizens"); see also id. at 3 (quoting the trial court as saying "Almighty God created
the races white, black, yellow, malay and red .... The fact that he separated the races shows
that he did not intend for the races to mix."). For a treatment of the comprehensibility of such
attitudes, see Oleske, supra note 61, at 22 24.
7' As an aside, recall that nothing about the exemptions being written into most marriage
equality laws are specific to sexual orientation they would excuse religious objections to
marriages or relationships on any grounds, including race. For proposed laws that apply more
narrowly to same-sex unions and marriages, see Carpenter et al., supra note 9.
71 New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 (2007); 110 MASS. CODE
REGS. 1.09(3) (2014); 102 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.03(1) (2014).
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reasons for doing so. 72 Nor could Catholic Charities have refused to place
children with couples who were remarried. State laws would not have ac-
commodated such objections.
So even if the race analogy is complicated, comparison to prohibitions
on differentiation based on marital status and religion itself point to the same
result. My provisional conclusion is that a prohibition on religion exemp-
tions in public accommodations and government licensing in marriage
equality laws does seem to cohere with scenarios in antidiscrimination law
about which there is a high degree of confidence. Comparing the scenarios,
in other words, supports the earlier application of principles of full and equal
citizenship, namely that we should hesitate to allow a religion exemption
that generates exclusion of same-sex couples from public accommodations.
4. Comparison to Refusal Laws or Conscience Clauses
But what if the correct comparison is not to antidiscrimination law, but
instead to protections for medical providers with moral objections to certain
reproductive choices? That might suggest a more permissive approach to
cases like Ocean Grove or situations like the one involving Catholic Chari-
ties of Boston.71
Multiple laws on the federal and state level extend significant solicitude
to medical providers who otherwise would have a duty of care with respect
to certain reproductive choices. These provisions, commonly known as re-
fusal laws or conscience clauses, exempt doctors and certain other medical
providers who would otherwise be asked to perform or assist in reproductive
activities, most commonly sterilization, abortion, and contraception. A semi-
nal provision was the 1973 Church Amendment, which prohibited federal
programs from conditioning funding on any requirement that an individual
"perform or assist in the performance of any sterilization procedure or abor-
tion if his performance or assistance in the performance of such procedure or
abortion would be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions. 74
More recently, the 2005 Hyde-Weldon Amendment extended the degree of
involvement to cover "facilitat[ing] in any way" the performance of an
abortion.7 5 It also expanded the definition of covered persons to include
72 Assume here that divorce and remarriage are anathema under the relevant religious
teachings.
" See Wen, supra note 32, at 3 (quoting the leader of a Catholic organization arguing that
Catholic Charities ought to have the benefit of a "conscience clause" that would exempt it
from the state's nondiscrimination requirement).
" 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2006). For an expert treatment of the background and typical con-
tent of refusal clauses, see Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-
Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manu-
script at 11 17).
15 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 (Hyde-Weldon Amendment), Pub. L No. 108-
447, § 103, 118 Stat. 2809, 2867 (2004) ("None of the funds appropriated under this title shall
be used to require any person to perform, or facilitate in any way the performance of, any
abortion.").
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some health insurers as well as individual providers, 76 and it provided ac-
commodation not only for an objectionable procedure, but also for "counsel-
ing or referral.."77
State laws have continued and expanded some of these exemptions,
though there is considerable variation in the provisions. Mississippi, for ex-
ample, accommodates not only physicians but "any individual who may be
asked to participate in any way in a health-care service;" 78 it relieves obliga-
tions not just for direct participation but for "any phase of patient medical
care, treatment or procedure," including referral and counseling; 79 and it
covers objections not just to abortion, sterilization, and contraception, but to
"any other care or treatment rendered by health care providers or health care
institutions."80 Moreover, the Mississippi law accommodates health care in-
stitutions81 and health care "payers,"8 2 in addition to individual providers.83
Not every state law goes this far, to be sure, but the Mississippi law can
provide a sense of the range of possibilities.
A few characteristics of this regime distinguish it from antidiscrimina-
tion law in its treatment of conscientious opposition. First and most
powerfully, conscience clauses usually apply regardless of whether accom-
modating objectors imposes serious burdens on patients seeking a medical
good or service. Although the clauses sometimes deny accommodation in
emergency situations,8 4 they do not typically contain limitations for situa-
tions in which lifting the requirement on the medical provider would impose
a substantial or significant burden on patients.8 5
7642 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(j)(3)(B) (2006).
77 Id.
71 See, e.g., Miss. CODE. ANN. § 41-107-3(b) (2004) (defining "health-care provider"
broadly); id. § 41-107-5(1) (2004) ("A health-care provider has the right not to participate, and
no health-care provider shall be required to participate in a health-care service that violates his
or her conscience."). For a detailed description of the Mississippi law, see NeJaime & Siegel,
supra note 74, at 14 15.
71 Id. § 41-107-3(a) (2004) ("'Health-care service' means any phase of patient medical
care, treatment or procedure, including, but not limited to, the following: patient referral, coun-
seling, therapy, testing, diagnosis or prognosis, research, instruction, prescribing, dispensing or
administering any device, drug, or medication, surgery, or any other care or treatment rendered
by health-care providers or health-care institutions.").
" Id. But see ADAM SONFIELD, RIGHTS VS. RESPONSIBILITIES: PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
AND PROVIDER REFUSALS, GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY 8, (2005), http://perma.cc/
QE2Y-NL5L.
" MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-107-7 (2013).
82d. § 41-107-9.
8 3 Id. § 41-107-5.
84 See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/6 (1998) ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed so
as to relieve a physician or other health care personnel from obligations under the law of
providing emergency medical care.").
85 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 (Hyde-Weldon Amendment), Pub. L. No.
108-447, 118 Stat. 2809 (2004) (protecting objectors without regard to consequences, even of
an emergency nature); 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2000) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West
2014) (providing, without an emergency exception, that "No person shall be required to per-
form or assist in the performance of an abortion or sterilization."); SONFIELD, supra note 80, at
8 ("Only a handful of [state refusal] laws specifically provide an exception to refusal rights in
emergency circumstances .... ).
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Second, conscience clauses generally extend protection not only to re-
ligious people, but to everyone who has a moral or conscience-based objec-
tion to involvement in a medical practice.8 6 This broad scope avoids
Establishment Clause problems that might follow provisions that relieved
only religious people but then shifted the cost of that relief onto women who
did not share those religious beliefs.8 7 Yet it also increases the impact on
affected third parties.
Conscience clauses claim to reflect widespread sympathy with
profound opposition to some forms of reproductive freedom and other medi-
cal choices. They allow private beliefs to prevail over general duties. There-
fore, drawing a comparison between refusal laws and marriage equality
statutes appears to push toward broad protection for religion from public
accommodations and government licensing law. Much as religious actors are
widely thought to deserve broad protections from having to assist with medi-
cal decisions to which they are opposed as a matter of conscience, so too
should religious actors be afforded protection from involvement with civil
marriages to which they are opposed as a matter of theology, it might be
thought.88
Even if protection afforded by conscience clauses or refusal provisions
is supportable as a matter of law and morality-and this article takes no
position on that question-several distinctions make this particular compari-
son inapposite.8 9 First, the directness of involvement often differs. Whereas
the majority of conscience clauses protect against personal facilitation of
medical choices, religion exemptions in marriage equality laws protect
against attenuated assistance as well: renting out public buildings or provid-
ing child placement services to couples who marry against theological rules,
for instance. In other words, religion accommodations in the marriage set-
ting protect against some attenuated involvement with the marriage itself.90
That marks an important distinction from conscience clauses, which gener-
86 See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4 (West 1998) (protecting refusals based on
"conscience"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-1 (West 2014) (protecting refusals made on any
ground); FLA. STAT. § 381.0051(5) (2012) (protecting decisions made on "medical or relig-
ious" grounds); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 1903 (2014) (protecting "religious or conscientious
objection[s]").
" U.S. CONST. amend. I. For further discussion of this constitutional rule, see infra Part
II.C.
88 See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage
from the Healthcare Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS 77, 80 81 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that conscience clauses in
the reproductive health care context can provide useful models for religion exemptions in the
context of civil marriage between people of the same sex or gender).
" Here I agree with Sepper, supra note 60, at 745 ("The analogy to conscientious objec-
tion in the medical model is inapt .... ").
" See generally id. at 743 (contrasting religion exemptions in the context of same-sex
marriage from conscience clauses in the medical context, most centrally because "virtually all
objections to marriage founder on the requirements of causal and proximate responsibility for
the act of marriage").
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ally shield only direct involvement with the controversial act (though a few
do go farther and protect institutions and insurers).91
Second and related, refusal or conscience clauses apply at a discrete
moment in time-they pertain to provision of a medical service, but they do
not license different treatment of people who seek those services outside that
moment. Some claims for religion accommodation with regard to same-sex
marriage are similarly momentary. For example, the association in Ocean
Grove only asked for permission to treat the lesbian residents differently
during the celebration of their civil union. Yet other claims reach much fur-
ther in time.9 2 Catholic Charities, for instance, wanted to be able to refuse
services to same-sex couples for as long as their relationships or marriages
lasted-potentially years after any wedding. Its claim therefore persisted
longer than the typical conscience clause, making it incomparable in this
respect. And some state statutes provide for accommodations that may en-
dure for long periods. For instance, as explained below, the D.C. law ex-
empts religiously affiliated organizations from "promot[ing]" a marriage by
providing certain services in violation of their beliefs.93 Provisions like that
last throughout the marriage-they could be invoked years after the wedding
itself.
Third, Elizabeth Sepper has argued powerfully that conscience clauses
concerning termination of pregnancy implicate life and death issues that in-
tersect directly with the ethics of the medical profession, to which they are
generally directed.9 4 They compare more readily to the core religion exemp-
tion that protects the ability of clergy to celebrate only the weddings that
conform with their theological beliefs than they do to requirements that a
religious organization not deny publicly-available facilities or social services
to LGBT people. Sepper concludes that the closer comparison for marriage
equality laws is to antidiscrimination provisions.9 5
In sum, while viewing these cases through an antidiscrimination lens is
straightforward-in fact, they actually are antidiscrimination provisions,
pertaining to public accommodations and government licensing-analogiz-
ing them to conscience clauses in the abortion context seems strained, partly
because religious actors are involved more indirectly and partly because ex-
emptions that pertain to a marriage, as opposed to a wedding, can endure far
longer than exemptions for performing abortions or for dispensing
contraception.
91 Clergy officiating at a wedding provide a more direct parallel to conscience clauses or
refusal provisions in the reproductive context, and that parallel supports constitutional protec-
tion for them.
92 NeJaime, supra note 11, at 1229 ("[T]he analogy to conscience clauses reflects a lack
of appreciation for the temporal difference between an abortion, which occurs at a specific
moment in time, and a marriage, which endures over a significant period of time.").
9 D.C. CODE § 46-406(e)(1) (2013).
9 Sepper, supra note 60, at 708. The life and death nature of the act also distinguishes
accommodation in the marriage equality context from conscientious objection in the areas of
compulsory military service and capital punishment.95 Id. at 761.
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The conclusion of this Part, after a search for coherence with basic prin-
ciples and paradigm cases, is that both Ocean Grove and the situation con-
cerning Catholic Charities of Boston were appropriately handled by the
states. That conclusion, if correct, raises serious concerns about some ex-
isting exemptions.
II. EXISTING EXEMPTIONS
Shifting focus to the pattern of statutory accommodations that have
been passed so far demonstrates that they would in fact upend attractive
outcomes in the two areas of public accommodations and government
licensing.
A. Public Accommodations
A common provision allows religious groups and religiously-affiliated
organizations to refuse to provide goods, services, facilities, and public ac-
commodations for the celebration and solemnization of any wedding to
which the organization is theologically opposed. Almost every marriage
equality statute contains some such provision. 96 Religious organizations are
defined variously but broadly to include houses of worship and religiously-
affiliated groups.97 Such organizations are then not required to provide "ser-
vices, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods or privileges" that are
related to the solemnization or celebration of a wedding to which the organi-
96 See supra note 2.
9 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-35a (West 2009) (applying the provision to "a
religious organization, association or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization oper-
ated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association or
society"); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-12.2(a) (West 2014) ("a religious organization or nonprofit
organization operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious organization"); 2012 Md. Laws
ch. 2 ("a religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organi-
zation operated, supervised, or controlled by a religious organization, association, or society");
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-b(1) (McKinney 2011) ("a religious entity as defined under the
education law or section two of the religious corporations law, or a corporation incorporated
under the benevolent orders law or described in the benevolent orders law but formed under
any other law of this state, or a not-for-profit corporation operated, supervised, or controlled
by a religious corporation, or any employee thereof, being managed, directed, or supervised by
or in conjunction with a religious corporation, benevolent order, or a not-for-profit corporation
as described in this subdivision"); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-3-6.1(c) (West 2014) ("a relig-
ious organization, association, or society, and any nonprofit institution or organization oper-
ated, supervised or controlled by a religious organization, association or society, or a fraternal
benefit or service organization that has among its stated purposes the promotion and support or
protection of a religious organization, association, or society and that restricts membership to
practicing members of that religious organization, association or society"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, § 4502 (2014) ("a religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution
or organization operated, supervised, or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organ-
ization, association, or society"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010(5) (West 2012) ("relig-
ious organization").
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zation is opposed on religious grounds." Hawaii lists only "goods, services,
[and] facilities," but otherwise is substantially similar.99 Washington State
goes somewhat further and specifies that, in addition to the standard activi-
ties listed in other statutes, the accommodation includes "use of any campus
chapel or church" for the celebration of a wedding. 100
Any of these provisions would allow a religious organization, broadly
defined, to refuse to allow same-sex couples to use its facilities for the cele-
bration of their weddings-thereby overturning the result in the Ocean
Grove case-because all of them apply even to buildings and event spaces
that operate as public accommodations. 10 1 Of course, the provisions do not
98 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-35a (West 2009); see also, e.g., 2012 Md. Laws ch.
2; N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 10-b(1) (McKinney 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-3-6.1(c)
(West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010(5)
(West 2012). Illinois' law is somewhat different. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 209 (West
2014) ("No [house of worship,] mission organization, or other organization whose principal
purpose is the study, practice, or advancement of religion is required to provide religious
facilities for the solemnization ceremony or celebration associated with the solemnization cer-
emony of a marriage if the solemnization ceremony or celebration associated with the solemni-
zation ceremony is in violation of its religious beliefs."). Unlike other states, Illinois limits this
provision by excluding "businesses, health care facilities, educational facilities, [and] social
service agencies," id., but it exempts all other religious organizations.
" HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-12.2(a) (West 2014).
... WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020(6) (West 2012).
101 It is true that some states exempt religious organizations from statutes preventing dis-
crimination in public accommodations. New York's Human Rights Law, for instance, states
that "a religious corporation incorporated under the education law or the religious corporations
law shall be deemed to be in its nature distinctly private" and therefore not a public accommo-
dation. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 2014). If such exemptions were widespread,
then the impact on public accommodations law of religion exemptions in marriage equality
laws might be quite limited.
However, state laws vary widely in the breadth of religion exemptions in public accommo-
dation statutes, and many of those exemptions would not change the outcome in a case like
Ocean Grove the religious organization would still be subject to public accommodations
law. Even in New York, the exemption just cited applies only to the state's Human Rights Law,
but not to its Civil Rights Law, which contains no such exemption. See N.Y. CiV. RIGHTS LAW
§ 40 (McKinney 2010). Moreover, the New York exemption only applies by its terms to relig-
ious corporations themselves, and not to religiously-affiliated nonprofits like the Ocean Grove
Camp Meeting Association. Finally, courts have construed the religious corporation exemption
narrowly. See Logan v. Salvation Army, 809 N.Y.S.2d 846, 848-49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005). For
an argument that Ocean Grove would have come out the same way in New York, before the
religion exemption in the state's marriage equality law, see David Wexelblat, Note, Trojan
Horse or Much Ado About Nothing? Analyzing The Religious Exemptions in New York's Mar-
riage Equality Act, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 961, 973 78 (2012). This suggests
that the exemption included in New York's marriage equality law made a real difference in the
law of public accommodations.
Other states that protect gay men and lesbians in their public accommodations laws have
religion exemptions that vary widely only a few of them might protect religious organiza-
tions and religiously-affiliated organizations absent accommodations in marriage equality stat-
utes. Many states do not exempt religious organizations from public accommodations law at
all. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2012) (Unruh Civil Rights Act); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 4502 (West 2013), § 4504; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 489-2 to 489-3 (West 2014); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 5-102.1 (West 2010) (stating only that the statute does not override
constitutional protections for religion); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (West 2014) (providing
no accommodation other than the one added as part of the marriage equality act). Others
exempt religious organizations, but not in their commercial activities. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
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mention facilities open to the public, but only because they apply by their
terms to all facilities, whether private or public. 10 2 That matters because all
of the relevant states prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion in their public accommodation statutes. 103 If this exemption of religious
actors from public accommodations laws is a matter of regret, as Part I ar-
gued it is, then there is cause for concern that so many states include such
protections as part of their marriage equality statutes.t04 They are dealing a
significant setback to antidiscrimination law, not only for LGBT people, but
potentially for others who wish to enter into unorthodox marriages.105
A few states have drawn their exemptions for religious services and
facilities in marriage equality laws somewhat more narrowly, perhaps nar-
rowly enough to preserve the outcome in Ocean Grove. For example, Illinois
allows religious organizations to refuse to open "religious facilities" for
wedding celebrations that are theologically objectionable, but does not ex-
tend this accommodation to goods, services, privileges, and the like.10 6 And
it then defines "religious facilities" so that the term does "not include facili-
ties such as businesses, health care facilities, educational facilities, or social
service agencies. 10 7 If the pavilion at Ocean Grove counts as a "business,"
then it would not be covered by the exemption, but of course that is not
certain.
Similarly, Minnesota has an accommodation for religious organizations
with theological objections to providing "goods and services" for solemni-
zation or celebration of a wedding, but it excludes from this accommodation
"secular business activities . . . the conduct of which is unrelated to the
religious and educational purposes for which [the religious association] is
ANN. § 363A.26 (West 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-37-4.2 (West 2014). One state ex-
empts all "religious organization[s]," but only from the prohibition on discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:2 (2007). Overall, then, few state
statutes exempt religious organizations from public accommodations laws in such a way that
the exemptions included in marriage equality statutes would be redundant.
102 In fact, the exemptions must be read to apply to public accommodations, because oth-
erwise they have no meaning after all, private entities are under no obligation to treat gay
and lesbian couples evenhandedly in the first place.
103 See infra note 138 and accompanying text. A possible consequence is that without a
religion exemption for same-sex weddings, religious groups may feel a need to close their
buildings to other groups in order to avoid being deemed a public accommodation that must
open their doors to theologically unorthodox weddings. See Troy Washington, Church boots
AA group over gay weddings, KLSA.coM (Oct. 9, 2014), http://permna.cc/UTZ8-CKJF (report-
ing that a Louisiana church discontinued allowing an Alcoholics Anonymous group to meet in
its buildings for fear that otherwise it would be subject to public accommodations laws that
would require it to allow same-sex weddings, citing the Ocean Grove case). As an advocate
quoted in the article pointed out, the church was mistaken it had nothing to fear because
Louisiana law does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, among other
factors that distinguish the Ocean Grove situation. See id.
104 See supra note 2.
105 Again, weddings of people of other faiths provide one potential example, and remar-
riages provide another.
106 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 209 (a-10) (West 2014).
107 Id. (emphasis added).
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organized . . ... 10 If providing a public accommodation is considered a
"secular business activity" of the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association,
then this provision would not reverse the result in that case.
New Jersey itself considered a bill that would codify the decision by the
state courts to extend civil marriage to gay and lesbian couples.109 At least
some versions of that bill excluded public accommodations from the com-
monplace exemption for assistance by religious organizations with weddings
and celebrations.110 Even with that limitation, however, the bill died in the
state legislature, reportedly because civil rights organizations were unwilling
to compromise on religion accommodations in the wake of a favorable judi-
cial decision.1
Every other marriage equality law, however, retrenches on civil rights
laws in this important respect. The result is that a potentially wide range of
public goods, services, and facilities are exempt from antidiscrimination pro-
visions, including university chapels and event spaces in some states.112
B. Adoption and Other Social Services
As the previous Part showed, the existing exemptions will lead to seri-
ous problems for public accommodations law. Whether adoption agencies
and other social service providers may refuse to serve same-sex couples,
married or unmarried, is a somewhat more complicated question under ex-
isting state statutes guaranteeing marriage equality. This Part will describe
three sorts of statutory religion exemptions that arguably allow social service
agencies to refuse service to gay and lesbian couples. But whatever the pre-
cise scope of those provisions, it doubtless is the case that at least some
adoption agencies and other social service providers will be able to refuse
service because of religious opposition to same-sex unions. Areas of law
implicated by these provisions include the public accommodations law ad-
"' More fully, the exemption reads "Except for secular business activities engaged in by a
religious association, religious corporation, or religious society, the conduct of which is unre-
lated to the religious and educational purposes for which it is organized, no religious associa-
tion, religious corporation, or religious society shall be required to provide goods or services at
the solemnization or celebration of any civil marriage . MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.09(3)
(West 2013).
... See Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013). The
State dropped its appeal of the decision. See Wilson, supra note 49, at 14 n.60.
110 N.J. S.B. 3109, 215th Leg. (introduced Dec. 12, 2013) ("No religious society, institu-
tion or organization in this State shall, other than when providing a place of public accommo-
dation ... be compelled to provide space, services, advantages, goods, or privileges related to
the solemnization, celebration or promotion of marriage if such solemnization, celebration or
promotion of marriage is in violation of the beliefs of such religious society, institution or
organization.") (emphasis added).
... See Ken Klukowski, NJ Stalls Same-Sex Marriage Bill To Kill Religious Protections,
BRIETBART.COM (Dec. 18, 2013), http://perma.cc/F2BL-HWD8 (explaining that Democratic
Senators pulled the bill after gay rights organizations such as Lambda Legal opposed "any
kind of religious exemption"); Wilson, supra note 49, at 14 n.60.
112 See, e.g., Benjamin Woodard, Loyola University Limits Campus Weddings in Wake of
Same-Sex Marriage Law, DNAINFO CHICAGO (Feb. 26, 2014), http://perma.cc/3QKB-QDGD.
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dressed in the last Part, because some adoption agencies have been consid-
ered public accommodations subject to state prohibitions on discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status.113 They also include
government licensing law, because some jurisdictions prohibit discrimina-
tion by government licensees in child placement services. Massachusetts is
one such jurisdiction, and that is why Catholic Charities of Boston could not
refuse to place children with same-sex couples. 114 Even aside from civil
rights statutes, common law rules in some jurisdictions prohibit all entities
that hold themselves open to the public from excluding anyone irration-
ally. 5 All of these laws set up potential conflicts with social service agen-
cies, including child placement organizations, that refuse to serve same-sex
couples on religious grounds.
Marriage equality statutes contain at least three types of accommoda-
tions that could affect social service providers. A first type of exemption
explicitly shields religious organizations engaging in adoption and other so-
cial services. For example, Connecticut's law exempts religious organiza-
tions engaged in adoption and other "social services," but only if they do
not receive government funding.1 1 6 Minnesota has a similar provision.1 1 7 Al-
though those provisions appear on their face to do nothing, since they simply
clarify that the state's marriage equality law will not affect the specified ac-
tivities, their presumptive purpose and effect is to insulate organizations like
Catholic Charities from repercussions from refusing to serve same-sex
couples.
Second, the broadest provisions exempt religious organizations from
"promoting" same-sex marriage through social services or other programs.
Although these provisions do not mention adoption or any other service spe-
cifically, they arguably leave room open for protection of organizations like
Catholic Charities. Specifically, it could be argued that placing children with
same-sex couples "promotes" their marriages by helping to build families
113 See, e.g., Butler v. Adoption Media LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1056 57 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (holding that same-sex couple stated a claim under California public accommodations
law for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation against a private adoption agency that
refused to serve unmarried couples, at a time when California law excluded same-sex couples
from civil marriage). Nonprofit organizations, including religious organizations, can count as
"business establishments" subject to California's public accommodations law if they offer
their services to the public. See Stevens v. Optimum Health Inst., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1089
(S.D. Cal. 2011).
114 See supra note 33. In many other states, however, licensing law is simply silent on
whether gay and lesbian couples may adopt. See Butler, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1046 (finding that
neither Arizona nor California law explicitly prohibited adoption by gay men or lesbian wo-
men, regardless of whether they were single or in relationships).
115 See, e.g., Uston v. Resorts Intern. Hotel, Inc., 89 N.J. 163, 173 (1982).
116 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-35b (West 2009) ("Nothing in public act 09-13 shall be
deemed or construed to affect the manner in which a religious organization may provide adop-
tion, foster care or social services if such religious organization does not receive state or fed-
eral funds for that specific program or purpose.").
117 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.201(b) (West 2013) ("This chapter must not be construed to
affect the manner in which a [religious organization, as defined] provides adoption, foster
care, or social services, if that association, corporation, society, or educational institution does
not receive public funds for that specific program or purpose.").
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that violate religious tenets.118 Rhode Island's law is one of the broadest. It
provides that religious organizations, including religiously-affiliated non-
profits, need not provide "services, accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods, or privileges" if those services, etc., are related to the "promotion of
marriage through any social or religious programs or services, which vio-
lates ... religious doctrine or teachings." 1 9 Note that the Rhode Island pro-
vision protects religious social service organizations even if they receive
government funding.1 20 Maryland has an accommodation that is otherwise
almost identical, and thus also arguably protects adoption agencies along
with other social service organizations, but it only exempts organizations
that do not receive public funds.1 21
Third, and least likely to exempt adoption agencies, are provisions that
specifically protect religious organizations from "promoting" unorthodox
marriages by extending services that are related to marriage, typically in-
cluding religious programs, counseling, courses, and retreats. 122 A few of
these laws specify married housing as something that need not be provided
to couples whose unions contravene the group's theology.1 23 Generally, these
118 Cf Avila, supra note 31, at 13 ("John Garvey, the dean of Boston College's Law
School, took the state to task for effectively forcing Catholic Charities of Boston out of the
adoption field 'because it won't promote an agenda that it views as morally wrong.' ") (empha-
sis added).
119 The full provision reads:
c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a religions [sic] organization, asso-
ciation, or society, and any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised
or controlled by a religious organization, association or society, or a fraternal benefit
or service organization that has among its stated purposes the promotion and support
or protection of a religious organization, association or society and that restricts
membership to practicing members of that religious organization, association or so-
ciety, shall not be required to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facili-
ties, goods, or privileges to an individual if the request for such services,
accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges is related to: ...
(2) The promotion of marriage through any social or religious programs or services,
which violates the religious doctrine or teachings of religious organization [sic],
association or society....
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-3-6.1(c)(2) (West 2014).
120 Id.
121 2012 Md. Laws ch. 2.
122 D.C. CODE § 46-406(e) (2013) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a [relig-
ious organization, as defined] shall not be required to provide [sic] . . . the promotion of
marriage through religious programs, counseling, courses, or retreats, that is in violation of the
religious society's beliefs."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010(7)(a)(ii) (West 2012) (ex-
empting religious organizations, as defined, from providing "religion-based services" that are
"designed for married couples or couples engaged to marry and are directly related to solem-
nizing, celebrating, strengthening, or promoting a marriage, such as religious counseling pro-
grams, courses, retreats, and workshops").
123 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 457:37(3) (2010) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, a [religious organization, as defined] shall not be required to provide services, accommo-
dations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges to an individual if such request for such
services, [etc.] is related to ... the promotion of marriage through religious counseling, pro-
grams, courses, retreats, or housing designated for married individuals."); N.Y. DoM. REL.
LAW § 10-b(2) (McKinney 2011) ("[N]othing in this article shall limit or diminish the right
. . . of any [religious organization, as defined] to limit employment or sales or rental of
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provisions are more narrowly drawn, targeting only social services that are
distinctly religious in nature and/or relate directly to marriage itself. If the
exempted "programs" are limited to marriage counseling and couples' re-
treats, for example, they would seem not to extend to adoption agencies.
Only under aggressive readings would they exempt general social services,
like child placement.
Nevertheless, the first two types of exemptions would likely reverse the
proper result in cases concerning discrimination against same-sex couples by
adoption agencies that constitute public accommodations. Moreover, it is
important to appreciate the breadth of these provisions. Some of them, espe-
cially the second type, may sweep in a variety of other religiously-affiliated
educational and social service organizations, and they may protect them not
only when they exclude gay men and lesbians, but also when they discrimi-
nate on other grounds out of religious conviction.
Just as important, as noted above, the provisions concerning adoption
placement and other social services discussed in this Part are not limited to a
discrete moment in time-the solemnization and celebration of a wedding-
but instead extend throughout the life of a marriage, potentially for de-
cades. 124 In other words, they operate to allow religious organizations to re-
fuse to "promote" (in specified ways) not just same-sex weddings, but the
entirety of same-sex marriages. This temporal reach helps to make them
powerful exceptions from civil rights laws.
C. Constitutional Principles and Baseline Questions
So far, this Part has raised normative difficulties with existing statutory
exemptions concerning facilities that function as public accommodations, on
the one hand, and adoption and other social services, on the other. These
difficulties have been overlooked or discounted in the religious freedom
literature, and they are worth highlighting. But there is another type of prob-
lem for existing exemptions, not mentioned above, namely constitutional
concerns under the Establishment Clause. These raise a distinctive set of
normative considerations as well as particular legal concerns.
A basic principle holds that governments may voluntarily lift regulatory
burdens from religious actors, but not if accommodating them shifts burdens
onto third parties. Driving that rule is the normative principle that shifting
burdens in this way would improperly impose the faith of one private party
on another, in violation of the government's obligation of evenhandedness in
the face of religious differences among citizens. It is possible to understand
housing accommodations or admission to or give preference to persons of the same religion or
denomination."). Cf MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.26 (West 2013) ("Nothing in this chapter
prohibits any [religious organization, as defined] from: .. .(2) in matters relating to sexual
orientation, taking any action with respect to education, employment, housing and real prop-
erty, or use of facilities. This clause shall not apply to secular business activities engaged in by
the [religious organization], the conduct of which is unrelated to the religious and educational
purposes for which it is organized.").
124 See supra notes 92 93 and accompanying text.
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this commitment as connected to both full and equal citizenship-full citi-
zenship because here protecting the religious liberty rights of one party
against the government would in fact impose on the liberty of others in vio-
lation of Justice Jackson's maxim, 125 and equal citizenship because voluntary
accommodations that work by imposing the religious beliefs of one party on
another impermissibly align the government with the religious convictions
of some citizens over others. When it comes to an identity characteristic as
socially salient as religion, government favoritism of that sort works consti-
tutional harm. 126
Court precedent gives the principle against burden shifting the force of
law. In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., for instance, the Court reasoned
that "[tlhe First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in
pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own
religious necessities. ' 127 It therefore held that a state could not require em-
ployers to accommodate every employee's Sabbath observance, no matter
what the impact on the business or on other employees. And in Cutter v.
Wilkinson, the Court returned to that principle, holding that in applying vol-
untary accommodations, "courts must take adequate account of the burdens
a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries .... -112 Ignor-
ing that principle risks the religious freedom rights of third parties. The
Court's recent decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. must not be
read to abrogate this longstanding rule. 129
125 See supra note 40.
126 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
THE CONSTITUTION 126 (2007); cf Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 648, 680 81 (2013) (arguing that government endorsement concerning other socially
salient characteristics, including sexual orientation, can also work constitutional harm).
127 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (internal citations omitted). Similarly, in United States v.
Lee, a free exercise case, the Court wrote: "When followers of a particular sect enter into
commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a
matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are
binding on others in that activity." 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
128 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). The leading article on the Establishment Clause burden-
shifting argument is Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions
from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 343 (2014); see also Micah Schwartzman et al., The Establishment Clause
and the Contraception Mandate, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013), http://perma.cc/A4ZT-
EW6S.
129 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). A footnote in Hobby Lobby appears to cast doubt on the third
party harm doctrine, partly on concerns about baselines. Id. at 2781 n.37. But it does so with-
out acknowledging the constitutional magnitude of the third party harm doctrine, grounded as
it is in the Establishment Clause, and it does so in a context where the Court assumed that no
harm to third parties would in fact result from its ruling. Moreover, Justice Kennedy, whose
vote was necessary to assemble the majority, was clearer that the absence of a harm to third
parties was a necessary predicate of the ruling in Hobby Lobby. Id. at 2786 87 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("[In America,] no person may be restricted or demeaned by government in exer-
cising his or her religion. Yet neither may that same exercise unduly restrict other persons,
such as employees, in protecting their own interests, interests the law deems compelling. In
these cases the means to reconcile those two priorities are at hand in the existing accommoda-
tion the Government has designed, identified, and used for circumstances closely parallel to
those presented here. RFRA requires the Government to use this less restrictive means.").
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Not all religion exemptions shift burdens to third parties in the relevant
way. Take, for example, the case of Holt v. Hobbs, recently decided by the
Supreme Court. 130 It involves a Muslim inmate who wishes to grow a beard
despite prison regulations which require inmates to be clean-shaven. Grant-
ing an exemption under RLUIPA would not impose a burden on anyone else,
aside from the government or the public generally.131 Similarly, the free ex-
ercise exemption that the Court granted in Sherbert v. Verner did not burden
any identifiable person or group-allowing a Saturday Sabbatarian to re-
ceive unemployment insurance despite refusing a job that would require her
to work on Saturday simply made the unemployment compensation system
somewhat more expensive to administer.13 2 Again, that kind of undifferenti-
ated cost is not enough to trigger Establishment Clause concerns. But sub-
stantial costs imposed on identifiable third parties because of religion
accommodations do raise those concerns, as the Court has repeatedly noted.
Here, statutory exemptions for religious actors in marriage equality
laws run up against this basic rule of constitutional law and the principle of
political morality that it embodies. To see how, return to the two examples
this article has been tracking. Both a provision that allows religious organi-
zations to close their facilities to same-sex couples and a provision that pro-
tects religious social service agencies threaten to impose costs on third
parties-namely the members of same-sex couples who seek to use those
facilities and services. That is true regardless of whether alternative facilities
or services are available to those couples. After all, the disadvantaged em-
ployees in Caldor could have sought other employment, and the employers
could have sought alternative employees in order to accommodate Sabbatari-
ans, but those search costs counted as the type of substantial burden that
Some may argue that there are other precedents contradicting the principle as well. See, e.g.,
Michael McConnell, Prof Michael McConnell (Stanford) on the Hobby Lobby arguments,
Volokh Conspiracy, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2014), http://perma.cc/8M8Y-CUVA. But all of
those precedents are distinguishable. In Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327
(1987), for example, the Court upheld the Title VII accommodation that allows religious em-
ployers to favor co-religionists. Although that accommodation may shift burdens to third party
employees, it is best understood as limited to churches, with their doctrinally distinctive asso-
ciational interests. See Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, & Nelson Tebbe, Hobby
Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part III: Reconciling Amos and Cutter, BALKINIZATION
(Dec. 9, 2013), http://permna.cc/STX7-UC24. Nor do any of the Court's other precedents pose
insurmountable obstacles to the burden-shifting argument. See Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schrag-
ger, & Micah Schwartzman, Reply to McConnell on Hobby Lobby and the Establishment
Clause, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 30, 2014), http://perma.cc/Q7A4-RAPK.
130 2015 WL 232143, U.S. (2015).
131 Id. at *12 (Ginsburg J., concurring) ("Unlike the exemption this Court approved in
[Hobby Lobby], accommodating petitioner's religious belief in this case would not detrimen-
tally affect others who do not share petitioner's belief. On that understanding, I join the Court's
opinion."). See also Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger, & Micah Schwartzman, Update on the
Establishment Clause and Third Party Harms: One Ongoing Violation and One Constitutional
Accommodation, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 16, 2014), http://perma.cc/3CAR-VQZ9 (arguing that
granting an accommodation in Holt v. Hobbs would not shift a burden to third parties); but see
Marc 0. DeGirolami, More Questions on the Significant Harm to Third-Parties Establishment
Clause Theory, CLR FORUM (Oct. 16, 2014), http://perma.cc/2C97-5LVT.
132 See 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
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could not be imposed without offending the Constitution. In sum, many of
the accommodations this article has been discussing will shift burdens to gay
and lesbian couples in straightforward ways.
One strategy for avoiding that conclusion would be to argue that be-
cause the relevant rights are statutory, they can be removed by marriage
equality statutes without imposing a "burden" on gay and lesbian couples.
Because LGBT people had no right to nondiscrimination by private parties
in the first place, the argument goes, returning them to that situation by stat-
ute cannot be considered a burden. Rights to equal treatment by private par-
ties in public accommodations and government licensing-to continue with
this article's two examples-are given by statute or local ordinance, and
therefore they can be removed by state statute without imposing a harm.
This is a classic baseline argument: it questions the basis for making a
judgment that a party has been burdened. Consider two possible baselines
for measuring a burden. Under the libertarian baseline, organizations that
provide goods and services to the public have a right to refuse service to
anyone for any reason, however irrational, unless civil rights laws provide
protection. Civil rights laws, in other words, mark a departure from the natu-
ral state of affairs. And even then, antidiscrimination protection is discre-
tionary and can be removed at any time without cost-that would simply
return the parties to the status quo ante. Under the equal access baseline, by
contrast, actors that provide goods and services to the public must serve
everyone, absent some business-related reason. Downward departures from
that baseline count as a burden. Selection of a baseline reflects substantive
concerns.
Here, objectors may argue that the libertarian baseline is the appropriate
one, so that religion accommodations in marriage equality statutes impose
no harm for purposes of burden-shifting arguments. This is similar to the
baseline argument that some have made in the context of the Hobby Lobby
litigation.133 There, the argument is stronger because the religion accommo-
dation, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, predated the right enjoyed by
third parties. Even aside from that point, Justice Alito seems to support the
libertarian baseline in a footnote, where he characterizes contraception cov-
erage as a "benefit," the implication being that it can be removed as part of
a religion accommodation without triggering the Cutter rule. 134
Regardless, the argument is questionable in both contexts. Statutory
schemes can set baseline guarantees, even as to other statutes or ordinances,
and they can work to impose deprivations on third parties that should be
regarded as burdens for the purpose of this particular constitutional princi-
ple. As Justice Scalia put it in another context,
133 See McConnell, supra note 129 (running the baseline argument in the context of
Hobby Lobby); Kevin C. Walsh, A baseline problem for the "burden on employees" argument
against RFRA-based exemptions from the contraceptives mandate, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Jan.
17, 2014), http://perma.cc/KJ99-9CSZ.
134 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37.
20151
Harvard Law & Policy Review
When the State makes a public benefit generally available, that
benefit becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on re-
ligion are measured; and when the State withholds that benefit
from some individuals solely on the basis of religion, it violates
the Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had imposed a special
tax. 135
That reasoning should apply to the Establishment Clause principle
against shifting harm to third parties, partly in order to make sense of prece-
dent and the constitutional convictions it implements. Otherwise, for exam-
ple, the Amish employer in United States v. Lee could have argued that
employees did not have a right to social security benefits, which could then
be denied without imposing a burden (consequent on accommodating his
religious objection to paying the relevant taxes). 136 Baseline expectations can
be set by statutory schemes that otherwise apply broadly to the benefit of the
relevant third parties, but for a voluntary religion accommodation.1 37 And at
present, roughly 21 states plus the District of Columbia ban discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation (with 17 of those also protecting gender
identity/expression) in areas including employment, housing, or public ac-
commodations. 38 Should LGBT antidiscrimination laws spread to other ju-
risdictions, they will raise the legitimate expectation of equal protection
among additional citizens.
This Part's argument that the burden suffered by third parties excluded
from antidiscrimination protections should indeed count as a burden draws
support from considering the role of the common law in this area. An as-
sumption of those promoting a libertarian baseline seems to be that back-
ground or natural entitlements allow entities that offer goods and services to
the public to exclude people for any reason (absent antidiscrimination law).
But that common law rule turns out to be constructed and contingent. First of
135 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726 27 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136 See 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). For a similar argument against the libertarian baseline
based on Lee, see Tebbe et al., supra note 129. Tellingly, when Congress created a statutory
exemption in response to Lee, it did so only insofar as employees share the employer's opposi-
tion to social security benefits and therefore would not be harmed. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3127 (2014).
137 See Nelson Tebbe et al., Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part H: What
Counts As A Burden on Employees?, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 4, 2013), http://perma.cc/QVZ2-
L89T; Gedicks & Van Tassel, supra note 128, at 44-45 (arguing against the baseline objection
in the context of Hobby Lobby). See also Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism 3 (June
3, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://perma.cc/X8RZ-K7GD (arguing that
current arguments for religion exemptions share with the Lochner Court an assumption of a
natural, laissez-faire baseline).
138 HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Equality From State to State 2013 at 12, http://perna.cc/
LS3T-ME4D. The states that protect against discrimination on the basis of LGBT status in
employment, public accommodations, or housing (typically all three) are: Minnesota (1993),
Rhode Island (1995, 2001), New Mexico (2003), California (1992, 2003), District of Columbia
(1977, 2005), Illinois (2005), Maine (2005), Hawaii (1991, 2005, 2006, 2011), New Jersey
(1992, 2006), Washington (2006), Iowa (2007), Oregon (2007), Vermont (1992, 2007), Colo-
rado (2007), Connecticut (1991, 2011), Nevada (1999, 2011), Massachusetts (1989, 2011), and
Delaware (2009, 2013). The states that only ban discrimination based on sexual orientation
are: Wisconsin (1982), New Hampshire (1997), Maryland (2001), and New York (2002).
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all, the libertarian baseline does not exist in every common law jurisdic-
tion-states have a choice. Several states have adhered to an equal access
rule instead.139 Second, historically, the equal access baseline was more
widespread during the nineteenth century, at least as to certain economic
actors and perhaps generally. 140 Many states abandoned it by statute only
after Reconstruction, when it became clear that it could be used by African-
Americans to gain access to public accommodations 141-in those jurisdic-
tions, the libertarian baseline may have been imposed under odious
circumstances. 142
To appreciate this history is not to suggest simply that the common law
provides an equal access baseline in many jurisdictions, against which relig-
ion accommodations can be said to impose a burden on same-sex couples. It
139 See, e.g., Uston v. Resorts Intern. Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 375 (N.J. 1982)
("[W]hen property owners open their premises to the general public in the pursuit of their
own property interests, they have no right to exclude people unreasonably. On the contrary,
they have a duty not to act in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner toward persons who come
on their premises. That duty applies not only to common carriers ... but to all property owners
who open their premises to the public."); Leach v. Drummond Med. Grp., Inc., 144 Cal. App.
3d 362, 372 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing a common law duty on all enterprises that hold
themselves out as providing goods or services to the public "to serve all members of the public
on reasonable terms without discrimination" and recognizing codification of that rule in Cali-
fornia's Unruh Civil Rights Act); Harder v. Auberge Des Fougeres, Inc., 338 N.Y.S.2d 356,
358 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (rejecting the distinction between inns and "other places of public
accommodation" under the common law and concluding that "[i]n our view, a restaurant
proprietor should be under the same duty as an innkeeper to receive all patrons who present
themselves 'in a fit condition', unless reasonable cause exists for a refusal to do so"); Beech
Grove Inv. Co. v. Civil Rights Comm'n, 157 N.W.2d 213, 226 27 (Mich. 1968) (discussing
the common law right against "unjust discrimination"). See also Note, The Antidiscrimination
Principle in the Common Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1993, 1996 (1989) ("In many jurisdictions,
the duty to serve doctrine has lain dormant for the last twenty years .... The absence of recent
cases largely results from the existence of regulatory statutes that responded to specific types
of refusals to serve.").
141 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND IN FOUR
VOLUMES (1765-69) ("[I]f an inn-keeper, or other victualler, hangs out a sign and opens his
house for travelers, it is an implied engagement to entertain all persons who travel that way;
and upon this universal assumpsit an action on the case will lie against him for damages, if he
without good reason refuses to admit a traveler."); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627
(1996) ("'At common law, innkeepers, smiths, and others who 'made profession of a public
employment,' were prohibited from refusing, without good reason, to serve a customer.' The
duty was a general one and did not specify protection for particular groups.") (quoting Hurley
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 571 (1995)
(explaining the common law of Massachusetts)); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 296 (1964)
(Goldberg, J., concurring) ("Underlying the congressional discussions, and at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection, was the assumption that the State by
statute or by 'the good old common law' was obligated to guarantee all citizens access to
places of public accommodation.").
141 See, e.g., Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661, 681 82 (1873) (holding that the state's com-
mon law includes a right of reasonable access to all public places).
142 Uston, 445 A.2d. at 374 n.4 ("The denial of freedom of reasonable access in some
States following passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the creation of a common law
freedom to arbitrarily exclude following invalidation of segregation statutes, suggest that the
current majority rule may have had less than dignified origins."). See generally Joseph Wil-
liam Singer, No Right To Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1283 (1996) (examining this history in detail).
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likely does not. Instead, the point is that the common law baseline cannot be
taken to be natural or neutral, but instead must be understood as contingent
and normatively contestable. Cass Sunstein made a similar point in his clas-
sic critique of Lochner.143 When we think about whether members of same-
sex couples have been burdened as a consequence of religion accommoda-
tions extended to entities that are public accommodations or otherwise sub-
ject to antidiscrimination provisions that protect LGBT people, in other
words, we ought to consider the objection that these third parties have not
been burdened as a normative question implicating constitutional principles
and commitments of political morality. Chiefly, commitments to full and
equal citizenship should be in play in the evaluation of claims that religion
accommodations shift burdens in violation of the Establishment Clause or
other constitutional provisions.
CONCLUSION
Much of the impetus behind these religion accommodations in marriage
equality statutes was political-they were included, in part, to address con-
cerns of potential opponents and thereby to ensure that the laws were
passed. 144 To many, the choice was not between marriage equality with relig-
ion accommodations and without, but between marriage equality with relig-
ion accommodations and continued exclusion of same-sex couples from civil
marriage. The gain in equality was thought to outweigh the cost to public
accommodations laws and other antidiscrimination provisions of exempting
certain religious actors.
How will this political calculus look in the future? The ongoing politi-
cal dynamics will affect the stakes of the questions raised by this article. We
can assess those dynamics and their consequences by considering three pos-
sible scenarios.
One possibility is that demographic changes will continue to push to-
ward statutory marriage equality, even in politically conservative states, and
that will generate additional marriage equality statutes. Andrew Koppelman
points out that 44 states will see majority support for same-sex marriage by
2020, according to the respected statistician Nate Silver. 145 If that is correct,
then equal access to same-sex marriage is all but inevitable in most states.
Seeing that trend, Robin Wilson has urged advocates of religious freedom to
compromise now, while the political conditions still give supporters of mar-
riage equality some reason to negotiate.146 Under this scenario, legislation
143 Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1987); see also Sep-
per, supra note 137 (applying a similar critique to the baseline arguments in Hobby Lobby).
144 See Wilson, supra note 49, at 5 7 (arguing that religion accommodations had an im-
portant causal role in passage of marriage equality laws, highlighting states where bills without
religion exemptions had failed previously but then passed with the accommodations).
145 See Koppelman, supra note 26, at 5 n. 15 (citing How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage
Is Changing, and What It Means, FiveThirtyEight, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013), http://perma
.cc/C9MU-NMJL).
146 Wilson, supra note 49, at 11 12.
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will continue to be passed. And because it is being enacted in states that are
more politically conservative, it is likely to include increasingly robust pro-
tections for religious freedom, at least in the near to middle term. 147
A second scenario is that the window of opportunity for enacting mar-
riage equality statutes on the state level has closed, and that statutory action
accommodation of religion will also cease, at least with respect to marriage
specifically. A rough proxy for whether a state has the political climate to
pass marriage equality legislation might be whether it has previously passed
LGBT antidiscrimination measures in employment, public accommodations,
and housing. By that measure, the politically friendly states have been ex-
hausted. Nevada and Colorado were perhaps the last states to protect against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity without
providing for marriage equality, and those states have now been required to
extend civil marriage to same-sex couples by judicial decisions.1 48 Under this
second scenario, a lack of state statutory action on marriage equality will
also mean a lack of statutory movement on religion exemptions. New Jersey,
for instance, declined to enact legislation implementing a court decision ex-
tending marriage equality in the state. Legislative leaders considered enact-
ing such a law, but they pulled the bill after civil rights organizations
expressed opposition to religion accommodations.1 49 This scenario imagines
that the political conditions do not favor religion exemptions after judicial
decisions in favor of marriage equality.
A third and final scenario sees a continued spread of judicial protection
combined with successful mobilizations to protect religious freedom around
marriage through state legislation. Courts certainly have been active on the
issue recently-and now the Supreme Court has agreed to hear challenges to
state bans on marriage equality.1 50 Under this scenario, judicial decisions
shift marriage equality into states with strong political support for religion
exemptions, which are then enacted by statute after a judicial decision.
Something similar happened in Connecticut, where legislation codifying a
decision by the high court included significant carve outs, including protec-
tion for religious adoption agencies that are privately funded.1 51 States to the
political right of Connecticut might be inclined to pass even stronger mea-
147 Id. at 11 ("Going forward, one would reasonably expect more robust religious liberty
protections to play a central part in any legislative compromises over same-sex marriage, at
least for the near term.").
148 Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265 (Oct. 6, 2014) (denying cert.); Order, Kitchen v.
Herbert, 2014 WL 4960471 (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 2014) (lifting stay after the Supreme Court
denied cert.); Latta v. Otter, 2014 WL 4977682 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014); Otter v. Latta, 135 S.
Ct. 345 (Oct. 10, 2014) (denying stay). Robin Wilson has concluded based on a similar analy-
sis that the opportunity for marriage equality statutes may be evaporating. Wilson, supra note
49, at 9 ("Marriage equality advocates have exhausted those jurisdictions in which a 'perfect
storm' of popular support, political characteristics, and background legal protections coalesced
to yield marriage equality."); id. at 10 (arguing that the "advantageous political terrain [for
marriage equality] is now nearly exhausted").
149 See supra text accompanying note 111.
150 DeBoer v. Snyder, 2015 WL 213650, -S. Ct. (2015) (granting cert.).
151 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-35a (West 2009).
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sures guaranteeing autonomy to religious actors in the wake of judicial deci-
sions. 15 2 Recently, for example, state legislators in North Carolina reacted to
judicial imposition of marriage equality by proposing to exempt marriage
officials, including judicial officers, from administering weddings to which
they were religiously opposed.153 If courts continue to require marriage
equality in politically conservative states, we could see a spate of local legis-
lative efforts to extend the various types of religion exemptions that this
article has discussed, although not the ones that relieve religious actors from
LGBT antidiscrimination provisions, which would not exist in such states.
Another way that legislative enactment of religion accommodations
could occur is if political conservatives won them in exchange for passing
152 An obstacle to state legislation after judicial invalidation of marriage exclusion could
be the notion that it is unnecessary. Most states that now exclude same-sex couples from civil
marriage also lack antidiscrimination protection for people in such marriages or for LGBT
citizens generally. See supra note 138 (identifying states that currently protect against private
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). Therefore, it might be thought that provi-
sions allowing, say, religious organizations to exclude same-sex couples from their facilities
are unnecessary because no law prevents them from doing that. However, several considera-
tions make legislation possible despite this argument.
First, local ordinances often prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and/or
gender identity, even if statewide law does not.
Second, some states may interpret a court decision to require government officials to admin-
ister weddings irrespective of sexual orientation, even in the absence of antidiscrimination
provisions. Cf Wilson, supra note 49, at 20 21 & n.81 (citing Statement of Iowa Attorney
General Tom Miller County Recorders must Comply with Supreme Court's Varnum Decision
(Apr. 21, 2009), http://perma.cc/B4NY-Y6JD ("Recorders do not have discretion or power to
ignore the Iowa Supreme Court's ruling."); Kilian Melloy, Iowa Magistrate to Stop Perform-
ing Marriages, EDGE BOSTON, Apr. 23, 2009, http://permna.cc/N8DC-F96F (quoting the Iowa
Attorney General's Office explaining that while justices of the peace may opt out of perform-
ing all weddings, those who decide to officiate must "do so without bias or prejudice, as per
the Code of Judicial Conduct," but that other officials such as county recorders may not opt
out of the duty to issue marriage licenses)). So there may be a perceived need to give specific
permission to religious actors who would otherwise be obligated to administer or promote civil
marriage for same-sex couples under general laws.
Third, religious liberty accommodations often appear in state statutes even though they du-
plicate other protections, as we have seen. For example, every marriage equality bill passed so
far has specifically allowed clergy to refuse to perform weddings to which they are theologi-
cally opposed. A similar dynamic could generate legislation that protects religious actors even
in states without civil rights laws that protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity.
Another obstacle to state legislation in the wake of a judicial decision could be the threat of
lawsuits charging that any religion accommodations that are enacted amount to government
licensing of unconstitutional discrimination against LGBT citizens, perhaps in violation of the
equality holding of that decision itself. But that theory faces state action hurdles. See Oleske,
supra note 61, at 44 n.219. And in any event, the possibility of litigation likely would not
prevent them from being enacted in the first place.
153 Berger Calls On Courts To Correct Erroneous Memo Threatening First Amendment
Rights, Jobs Of N.C. Magistrates, NCPOLITICALNEWS.COM (Oct. 26, 2014), http://perma.cc/
ENZ7-66H6. The legislators were reacting to a letter from the Administrative Office of Courts
advising officials that they were under a duty to serve all couples equally. Letter from John W.
Smith, supra note 23. One provision of scholars' proposed legislation on religion exemptions
in same-sex marriage laws exempts individual government employees from having to perform
or administer weddings to which they are religiously opposed. It contains an exception for
situations where no substitute employee is available, but it provides that the exemption for
judicial officers is absolute. See Gaffney et al., supra note 6, at 5.
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antidiscrimination protection for LGBT people in employment, public ac-
commodations, and housing. New Jersey already provided that protection at
the time its bill died, but again the debate over marriage equality is now
moving into states without antidiscrimination measures, where they could be
traded for religion accommodations. 154
Under either scenario one, where marriage equality statutes continue to
spread to states without judicial decisions, or scenario three, where judicial
invalidations lead to statutory enactment of religion accommodations, we
could continue to see legislation on the state level that exempts religious
actors in the marriage context. And under either scenario there could be
pressure for even broader religion accommodations in a variety of areas,
including government licensing, employment benefits, and even conscience
clauses for government employees including judicial officers. If that is cor-
rect, the stakes could continue to be high, and the arguments presented in
this article would have ongoing relevance, even if they could only affect
outcomes on the margins and under specific political and legal conditions.
154 See Wilson, supra note 49, at 12 n.55 (discussing the possibility of that kind of
exchange).
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